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EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE: PRIVILEGE OF DEFENDANT TO PREVENT ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY ABOLISHED-Trammel v.

United States, 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
INTRODUCTION

The privilege' of the defendant in a criminal trial to prevent
adverse spousal testimony, often called the anti-marital facts privilege,'
has been recognized since at least 1580.1 Although it had undergone
some changes," it virtually remained intact, especially in the federal
5
courts, until the recent decision of Trammel v. United States. In its

early stages of development, what is today labeled a privilege was not
actually a privilege, but instead a disqualification: husband and wife

were deemed incompetent to testify for or against each other.6 This
disqualification was believed necessary for two reasons: 1) the ex-

istence of the privilege against self-incrimination,' and 2) the evidentiary rule which was thought to avoid the risk of perjury by preventing
the defendant from taking the stand in his own behalf.' These rules,
combined with the attitude that husband and wife were one unit, resulted in the disqualification. 9 The defendant could not take the stand
1. Privileges are not mere exclusionary rules like those excluding hearsay or certain character evidence; they are substantive laws created to foster or affect the
conduct and/or status of individuals outside court. While privileges do exclude
certain evidence from a judicial proceeding, this exclusion is merely a means of effecting a state policy considered more important; it is never an end in itself.
Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives:A CriticalExamination of the Proposed
FederalRules of Evidence as They Affect MaritalPrivilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353,
1358 (1973).
2. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 600, at 212 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The label
"anti-marital facts" has been used to signify the testimony of husband or wife against
the other. Id. at 210.
3. An English case is reported which predates even the now obsolete disqualification of spouses to testify, adversely or favorably, at their spouses' trials. Bent. v.
Allot, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch 1580). Even though a woman was allowed to testify at her
husband's trial, incriminating testimony was prohibited.
4. The evolution of the privilege is discussed briefly in the material which
follows. For a more thorough history, see Wigmore's examination of the privilege, 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2227-28, at 210-22 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
5.: 100 S. Ct. 906 (1980).
6. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227, at 211-212 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
8. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), overruled, Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). See also Comment, Husband-Wife Evidentiary
Privileges: The Power of the FederalCourts to Seek a RationalSolution, 17 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 107, 107-09 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Husband-Wife] for a discussion of the
historical rationale for the privilege.
9. See Husband-Wife, supra note 8, at 109.
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in his own behalf because of the risk of self-serving falsehoods, and
could not testify adversely because of the privilege against selfincrimination. It followed that the defendant's spouse should also be
disqualified, because they were considered to be a single unit.'" The
spouse, therefore, was deemed incompetent to give reliable testimony.
In the federal courts this incompetency was eroded gradually, until
in Funk v. United States," the Supreme Court ruled that a spouse may
testify favorably for a defendant. Procedure had changed to allow
defendants to testify in their own behalf, and the Court reasoned that
there was no longer any justification for disqualification of spouses. It
was apparent to the Court that if the risk of the jury being misled by
perjured testimony is not too great to prevent the defendant from taking the stand, then there should be no basis for disqualification of the
defendant's spouse to avoid false testimony.' 2 The Court in Funk
noted further that the domain of competency was being expanded, and
that this general trend also required a ruling that favorable testimony
by the witness spouse be allowed.' 3 Funk changed what had been disqualification into a privilege that allowed the defendant to prevent
adverse spousal testimony."
The privilege in its post-Funk state persisted, despite a great deal of
criticism," and was soundly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Hawkins v. United States." The most frequently expounded modern
justification for preserving the privilege is the need to avoid the marital
disharmony which would be created if one spouse were to give testimony adverse to the other. The oft-repeated criticism of this rationale
is that if one spouse is willing to testify against the other there must be
little harmony left to preserve."
10. Id.
11. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
12. Id. at 377.
13. Id. at 376.
14. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958).
15. For a number of years commentators have been strongly denouncing the
privilege as being without a rational basis. Few have written stronger criticism than
Wigmore, who states:
The record of judicial ratiocination defining the grounds and policy of this
privilege forms one of the most curious and entertaining chapters of the law of
evidence. It is curious because the variety of ingenuity displayed, in the invention
of reasons 'ex post facto' for a rule so simple and so long accepted, could hardly
have been believed but for the recorded utterances.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228 at 213 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also, C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 89 (2d ed. 1972).

16.
17.

358 U.S. 74 at 76 (1958).
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 216 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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NOTES

The privilege affirmed by the Hawkins decision for use in the
federal courts Was actually three separate privileges:
1) The right of the witness spouse to refuse to testify against the
defendant spouse;
2) The privilege of the defendant spouse to prevent the witness
spouse from testifying adversely; and
the revelation
3) The privilege of the defendant spouse to prevent
8
communications.1
marital
of confidential
Until the Trammel decision, the three-part privilege above remained
consistently in force in the federal courts, albeit subject to a few exceptions. 9 The Trammel decision eliminated the privilege of the defendant to prevent adverse spousal testimony.
In the state courts, four separate paths have been taken. A small
minority of states retain the entire Hawkins rule, and make the witness
spouse incompetent to testify adversely, whether the defendant asserts
the privilege or not."0 Slightly less than one third of the states follow
the Hawkins rule, protecting the privilege of the defendant to bar
adverse spousal testimony by timely objection. 2' Another small group
18. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
19. To avoid injustice wherever possible, exceptions to the rule have been created
that permit the defendant's spouse to give testimony. One exception has been called
the "necessity" exception. In cases where the defendant has committed a crime against
the spouse, the spouse is allowed to give testimony and the defendant may not stop it
by asserting the marital privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752
(5th Cir. 1977); Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1976).
A second, more recent, exception has developed where the victim is the child of
either spouse. In these cases, most jurisdictions again allow adverse spousal testimony
and refuse to acknowledge the defendant's privilege to exclude it. See, e.g., United
States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975). Contra, State v. McGonigal, 89 Idaho
177, 403 P.2d 745 (1965).
Additionally, Congress and many state legislatures have created statutory exceptions. Among these are cases in which the defendant is accused of bigamy or charged
with a violation of the Mann Act. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960) in
which the defendant's wife was wrongly compelled to testify in her husband's trial for
Mann Act violations, but the testimony was held to be admissible.
20. Eight states follow the strict incompetency rule. An example of a statute
which makes the defendant's spouse incompetent is OHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42

(Page 1975 & Supp. 1979). Section 2945.42 provides in relevant part:
Husband and wife are competent witnesses to testify in behalf of each other in all
criminal prosecutions, and to testify against each other in all actions, prosecutions, and proceedings for personal injury of either by the other, bigamy, or
failure to provide for, neglect of, or cruelty to their children ....

Note that' even in the strictest form of statute upholding the privilege, exceptions to
the privilege are still recognized. See 100 S. Ct. 906, 911 n.9 for a listing of the states
following the strict incompetency rule.
21. Sixteen states treat the exclusion of adverse spousal testimony as a privilege
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of states retains only the confidential communications privilege, and
the privilege of the witness spouse to refuse to testify." About one
third of the states have totally abolished the privilege for either the
defendant or the witness spouse in criminal cases, allowing protection
only of confidential marital communications. 23
FACTS AND DECISION

In 1976, Otis Trammel and two others were indicted for importing
heroin, and conspiracy to import heroin from the Philippines to
California. ' Defendant Trammel's wife, Elizabeth Ann, had been apprehended with heroin in her possession during a customs search after
a flight from Thailand. "5 She was-arrested, and, in exchange for immunity, agreed to cooperate with the federal authorities.2
At the hearing on a motion to sever his case from the other two
defendants, Trammel attempted to prevent his wife's adverse testimony, relying on the common law privilege to support his contention
that it should not be admitted at trial." The motion to sever was
denied, and the District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify as
to any act observed or any communication made in the presence of a
third person, stating that only confidential communications would be
which the defendant may choose to assert. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17
(West 1976). The relevant portion of the New Jersey statute provides: "The spouse
of
the accused in a criminal action shall not testify in such action . . . unless a)
such
spouse and the accused both shall consent." Comment 9 to this statute makes
clear
that calling defendant's spouse as a witness will not be an error if the defendant fails
to
object. See 100 S. Ct. 906, 911 n.9 for a complete list of states which uphold the
antimarital facts privilege of the defendant.
22. Nine states vest the anti-marital facts privilege in the witness spouse. Among
them is California. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (West 1966) provides in part: "Except
as
otherwise provided by statute, a married person has a privilege not to testify against
his
spouse in any proceeding." The accompanying comments make it clear that defendant
spouses no longer have the privilege to prevent witness spouses from testifying
against
them. This is the approach which the Supreme Court followed in Trammel. See,
100 S.
Ct. at 911 n.9 for a complete list of state statutes which shift the marital privilege
to
the witness spouse.
23. Seventeen states have abolished the privilege completely in criminal cases.
See
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2231 (Supp. 1979) which provides: "In a civil action
a
husband shall not be examined for or against his wife without her consent, nor
a wife
for or against her husband without his consent." But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§
12-2232 (Supp. 1979) which acknowledges that confidential communications between
husband and wife are still privileged in criminal actions. See Trammel v. United
States,
100 S. Ct. at 911, for the remaining sixteen states that have abolished the privilege.
24. 100 S. Ct. at 908. The importing of heroin and the conspiracy to import
heroin are both federal criminal offenses as defined by the United States Code.
21
U.S.C. §§ 952(A), 963 (1976).
25. 100 S. Ct. at 908.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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held privileged and excluded from testimony.2" Accordingly, Elizabeth
Trammel was permitted to give the testimony which resulted in Otis
Trammel's conviction. 29
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,30 Trammel again attempted to exclude his wife's testimony, citing
the Supreme Court case of United States v. Hawkins,3 in support of
his claim. Trammel lost on appeal, the tenth circuit ruling that the
Hawkins decision did not apply to the testimony of a spouse who appeared as an unindicted co-conspirator under a grant of immunity.32
Trammel appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States
which granted certiorari.The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the lower courts' decision, but not on the ground that the Hawkins
rule was inapplicable to these facts. The Trammel court chose instead
to overrule Hawkins, thus removing the common law privilege of the
defendant to prevent adverse spousal testimony for all cases and not
just under the narrow set of facts of a grant of immunity.33
ANALYSIS

A. Effect of the Decision.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Trammel to overrule
Hawkins does not abolish all three parts of the common law
privilege. 3 ' The Court expressly declared that confidential marital communications were not being dealt with in Trammel, and accordingly remain unchanged by the decision.3 5 Additionally, the Court emphasized
that the witness spouse may not be compelled to testify adversely
28. Id.
29. Id. Elizabeth Trammel's testimony was the only evidence which the government presented in its case against Trammel. Id.
30. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978).
31. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). In Hawkins, the Court examined the common law
privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony. The Court determined that the need to promote marital harmony was still a valid reason for retaining the privilege, and reaffirmed the existence of this privilege in the federal courts.
32. Trammel v. United States, 583 F.2d at 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1978). The opinion
of the tenth circuit discusses the definite ruling in Hawkins which clearly affirmed the
common law privilege, but notes that in the Hawkins opinion the Supreme Court
stated that the courts have "the right and responsibility to examine the policies behind
the federal common law privileges and to alter, modify, or amend them when reason
and experience so demand." Id. at 1168. The court further explained that this was a
case in which reason and experience compelled the finding that the privilege did not
override the governmental grant of immunity.
33. 100 S. Ct. at 914.
34. See text accompanying note 18 supra (for an explanation of the three separate
parts of the privilege).
35. 100 S. Ct. at 912-13.
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against the defendant spouse. 36 The Court left these two parts of the
privilege intact, but completely erased the most widely-used of the
three, the privilege of the defendant to stop adverse spousal testimony."
Under the Trammel decision, the defendant's spouse may voluntarily give adverse testimony against the defendant, but cannot be
compelled to do so. 3 The effect of this is to shift control over the exercise of this privilege from the defendant to the witness spouse. The
defendant may only assert the common law privilege to stop spousal
testimony which involves disclosure of communications made in confidence during marriage. The privileges which remain apply whether
the defendant is the husband or the wife. 39
By overruling Hawkins, the Supreme Court in Trammel finally
eliminated a long standing bar to obtaining evidence in criminal trials.
In view of a similar trend in the state courts,"' and the abundance of
scholarly criticism," ' the decision is startling, if at all, only in its occurrence without apparent new justification.4 2 Rather, as Justice Stewart
stated in his concurring opinion, the foundation for the privilege has
disappeared, and such a decision is overdue. 3
B. The Court'sRationale.
In reaching its decision to overturn Hawkins, the Court
acknowledged that the common law justifications for the privilege and
the modern rationale are no longer appropriate.)" The concept of husband and wife being one has been abandoned. 5 It is generally acknowledged also, that prevention of adverse spousal testimony does not
really promote marital harmony, and therefore, the claim of preservation of the family relationship does not justify the exclusion of impor-

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See notes 20-23 and accompanying text supra.
See note 18 supra; Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 909 n.4, 912

n.ll.

42. Justice Stewart makes this the basis of his concurring opinion, in which he
criticized the Burger opinion for adopting a position that was not accepted in
Hawkins, but without any rationale that is new to the Trammel decision. 100 S. Ct. at
914.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 913.

45. In tort law intrafamily and intraspousal immunities were based on this concept and in recent years it has been abandoned and the immunities, for the most part,
abolished. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol6/iss1/10
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tant and voluntary testimony." To further support its decision to
eliminate the privilege, the Court noted that attitudes toward marriage
are changing, 7 and that in a marriage where one spouse is willing to
testify adversely to the other, nothing the courts can do is likely to save
the marriage.' 8
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, criticized the Burger
opinion for only considering the types of rationales which were available when the Court declined to eliminate the privilege in Hawkins v.
United States."9 Justice Stewart stated that although the reasons offered for abandoning the privilege are ample, the same reasons were
rejected by the Court in 1958 as not sufficient to justify abandoning
the privilege.5" To qualify this reversal of opinion, the Court stated
that "reason and experience" dictate such a change." This statement
does little to explain the basis for the Court's change of position on
this matter.
The Trammel Court relied heavily on language in Hawkins which
stated that although the marital privilege was being affirmed in its entirety, it was not intended to foreclose changes which might eventually
be dictated by reason and experience.52 Additionally, the Court placed
considerable emphasis on the argument that the privilege upheld in
Hawkins did not really promote marital harmony when the spouse was
willing to testify adversely.53
With respect to the Court's strong emphasis on these two points,
Justice Stewart is correct in his statements that the majority has merely
accepted what was dismissed as unconvincing by the Hawkins
decision. 5 ' Burger's opinion does hint that the change of stance was
partially a result of the changing role of marriage," but falls short of
46. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 77 (2d ed.
1972).
47. 100 S. Ct. at 913. The Court commented that women are no longer regarded
as chattels or denied separate legal identity. The opinion quotes a passage from a
divorce case, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), as reason for abandoning the ancient basis for the privilege.
48. 100 S. Ct. at 913. The Court commented that when the spouse is willing to
testify adversely, "a rule of evidence that permits an accused to prevent adverse
spousal testimony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to foster family
peace." Id.
49. Id. at 914.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. 358 U.S. at 79.
53. 100 S. Ct. at 913.
54. Id. at 914.
55. Id. at 913, (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Burger states:
"[N]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." Id. at 14-15).
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explaining exactly what has occurred since 1958 to call for this change
in approach. Justice Stewart's criticism of the Court's argument that
marital harmony is not really promoted by the privilege is also valid.
The argument itself is compelling and sound, but as Justice Stewart
notes, the Court unanimously rejected the same reasoning in
6
Hawkins.
These, however, are not the only reasons the Court relied upon for
abandoning the privilege. The flaw in the majority opinion was not a
failure to supply any rationale for a reversal by the Court, but was
rather a misplaced emphasis. Two justifications for modification of
the Hawkins rule were set forth by the majority. First, the Burger opinion states that some modification to allow voluntary adverse testimony by the witness spouse is now the majority approach among the
states.5" The opinion indicates that this was significant to the Court
because marriage and domestic relations are areas of concern traditionally reserved to the states. 8 Second, the Court acknowledged an
argument that the interest in arriving at truth outweighs the need to
avoid the possibility of creating marital disharmony. This argument
was not discussed in the Hawkins majority opinion. Justice Stewart
made a similar argument, however, in his concurring opinion in
Hawkins,59 when he stated, "[A]ny rule that impedes the discovery of
60
truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice."1
The Court in Trammel stopped at the mere conclusion that on
balance, upholding the anti-marital facts privilege is not sufficient
justification for excluding significant evidence. 6 ' This rationale, combined with the existence of a similar trend among the states, provides a
more convincing justification for modification of the Hawkins rule,
and should have been given more emphasis by the Court. Since the
witness spouse has always had the right to give adverse testimony, the
Hawkins rule served only to prevent willing spouses from testifying.
This was an unnecessary suppression of important testimony.
These apparent shortcomings in analysis can perhaps be overlooked because the opinion will probably be viewed with disfavor by
very few. Any problems with the opinion result more from an attempt
to justify the stance taken in Hawkins than from lack of support for

56.

358 U.S. at 77.

57.
58.

100 S. Ct. at 911.

61.

100 S. Ct. at 914.

Id. at 912.
59. 358 U.S. at 81.
60. Id.
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NOTES

the Trammel approach. The Court cited several commentators whose
writings provide rationale for eliminating the privilege.6 2
The Court avoided dealing with confidential communications
because no marital communications were involved in the Trammel
case. The Court did note, however, that the privilege to prevent
disclosure of confidential marital communications would remain unchanged by Trammel.6 A reason for the Court's avoidance of this
issue may be the tradition of the Supreme Court to decide only issues
necessary to the case at bar. To deal with an issue not before the Court
would only produce dicta." It can be expected, however, that as a
result of the Trammel decision issues relating to the confidential communications privilege will frequently arise. If defendants can no longer
bar adverse testimony simply because it comes from their spouses, they
will try to stretch the confidential communications privilege to
eliminate the testimony.
Since the Court in Trammel changed a procedural rule which
predates this country, some guidelines for use of what remains of the
privilege will eventually be necessary. Accompanying the Trammel
Court's statement that confidential communications were not at issue
is a citation to a case which does not provide a helpful definition of
what communications will be privileged. 6 - In jurisdictions which
acknowledge the existence of the confidential communications privilege, 66 considerable confusion and increased litigation have resulted as
to what constitutes a privileged communication. 6 7 The Supreme Court
has not resolved the confusion in past decisions, preferring to decide
the issue on a case by case basis.6 The Trammel decision makes
62. Id. at 909.
63. 100 S. Ct. at 913.
64. Texas Ry. Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
65. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951), which the Trammel decision cited,
provides no definition or standard for determining what is a confidential communication. The Blau opinion states that marital communications are presumptively confidential. Id. at 333 (citing Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). The standard which
Wolfie provides is as follows:
Communications between the spouses, privately made, are generally assumed to
have been intended to be confidential, and hence they are privileged; but,
wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under
which it is made, was obviously not intended to be confidential, it is not a privileged communication.

Id. at 14.

66. Virtually all of the state statutes, even those completely abolishing the marital
privilege, still protect the confidential marital communications privilege. See notes
20-23 supra.
67. For a discussion of the confusion surrounding privileged communications, see
Husband-Wife, supra, note 8 at 110-15.
68. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
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privileged communications the only part of the privilege which the
defendant may still assert. Overuse of this aspect of the privilege may
result in confusion warranting future guidelines by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

The decision of the Supreme Court in Trammel to eliminate the
privilege of the defendant to bar adverse spousal testimony is a significant step toward making important evidence accessible in criminal
trials. Since witness spouses may still refuse to give testimony, the
Trammel rule may not be used to force unwilling persons to become
adversary to their spouses, but will avoid forcing witnesses to protect
guilty individuals simply because they are married to them. As Justice
Stewart pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Court has adopted a
position clearly superior to the Hawkins rule."' Trammel is an indication that the Court has finally accepted what scholars have been asserting for years. In closing his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote:
The court is correct when it says that '[t]he ancient foundations for so
sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared' ..... But those foundations had disappeared well before 1958; their disappearance certainly did
not occur in the few years that have elapsed between the Hawkins decision and this one. To paraphrase what Mr. Justice Jackson once said in
another context, there is reason to believe that today's opinion of the
Court will be of greater interest to students of human psychology than to
students of law."0

To eliminate the common law obstacle to obtaining evidence, the
federal courts will make modifications in accordance with Trammel.
Additionally, the number of state courts abolishing the privilege or
shifting it to the witness spouse will probably increase to a more
substantial majority. Because Trammel v. United States involves a procedural issue, it will not be mandatory authority for the state courts."
Those twenty-six states which have already abolished the privilege entirely or shifted it to the witness spouse will have significant support
for their choice. The remaining twenty-four states will still be free to
ignore Trammel, but at least a few can be expected to find the decision
persuasive.
Brenda M. Kloos
69.
70.
71.

See note 66 supra.
100 S. Ct. at 914.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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